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In our target article we showed that the Letter of Concern (LoC) fails to 
meet accepted standards for presenting empirical data for the purpose of 
supplementing a normative claim and for argument-based normative 
ethics. The LoC fails to meet the standards of evidence-based reasoning 
by making false claims, failing to reference data that undermine its key 
premises, and misrepresenting and misinterpreting the scientific 
publications it selectively references.  The LoC fails to meet the standards 
of argument-based reasoning by treating as settled matters what are, 
instead, ongoing controversies, offering “mere opinion” as a substitute for 
argument, and making contradictory claims. The LoC is methodologically 
defective and thus a case study in unethical transgressive bioethics. Not 
withdrawing the LoC will damage the field of bioethics, making this case 
study in unethical transgressive bioethics important for the entire 
field. 
 
MEETING THE STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE-BASED AND ARGUMENT-BASED 
REASONING IN BIOETHICS 
 
We deliberately refrained from addressing normative concerns regarding 
whether dexamethasone ought to be recommended for use in gravid 
women at risk for transmitting CAH to a child. Most of the commentators 
(Dolan 2010; Green 2010; Kamenova 2010; Reis and Kessler 2010; 
Robichaud 2010; Tamar-Mattis 2010) take us to task for giving short shrift to 
this. Whatever ancillary merits their arguments have, they miss the point: It 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to hold any particular view regarding the 
normative advisability of recommending dexamethasone in this clinical 
context, in order to insist that thosewhoadvance any particular normative 
view of the matter have an obligation, as amatter of intellectual and moral 
integrity in bioethics, to meet the standards of evidence-based and 
argument-based reasoning. 
 
Kraft (2010) takes the view that “bioethical reflection requires the 
interrogation of practices that appear problematic” (emphasis added). 
This is an invitation to anarchy when“appearances” fail to correspond to 
facts in plain view.  Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann (2010) dismiss the 
requirement of evidence-based reasoning as “weird logic.” If hewing 
to the “right” normative ends is sufficient grounds for exempting scholars 
from adherence to accepted standards of intellectual and moral integrity, 
then both scientific and normative inquiry are gravely damaged. If this 
egregiously defective methodology is accepted in bioethics, the field 
shall be, justly, consigned to History’s dustbin as mere politics by other 
means.  
 
It is therefore scandalous to find that only Lantos (2010) addresses any of 
the series of empirical missteps found in the LoC. No other commentator 
thinks it ethically important enough to emphasize that all the pertinent 
empirical data on the effects of dexamethasone on fetal phenotypic and 
cognitive development, or on gravid women, should be accurately 
presented before publicly issuing a j’accuse.  They endorse the ethical 
permissibility of falsely insinuating that a prominent researcher willfully and 
systematically ignored these considerations. One would never know, from 
the LoC, or these commentaries, that Dr. New’s research for the last two 
decades has focused precisely on the study of the long-term outcomes of 
this therapy for gravid women and their children and has had IRB 
approval. Instead, our criticism is characterized as a gratuitous and 
spectacular display (at best), as illicit “monitoring”or “silencing,” or (at 
worst) as a surreptitious attempt to deflect regulatory attention. It is 
staggering that many of the commentators believe that Dr. New need not 
fear the repercussions of damaging and widely promulgated 
accusations—the worst possible interpretation of her motives rearranged 
as tendentious rhetorical questions1 —and an aggressive invitation to 
regulatory scrutiny, unless she somehow has something to hide. This is 
Salem’s justice.  The collateral damage already done to Dr. New’s 
reputation is derived from an illicitly borrowed presumption of scholarly 
due diligence on the part of her critics. When this presumption is abused, 
as it is in the LoC, it is more than her critics who suffer. It is the intellectual 
and moral integrity of bioethics itself. 
 
Only Lantos seems to recognize our original point, that a randomized, 
prospective clinical trial (which no one, including Dr. New, fails to endorse 
as a methodological ideal), in the case of a disease with a very low 
incidence and prevalence, is so statistically underpowered as to be 
meaningless or, worse, materially misleading. The European PREDEX study 
represents the moral and methodological ideal insisted upon in the LoC. 
However, it has been able to enroll so few subjects that its data have been 
so riddled with Type I errors that it has not been able to reproduce 
previously reported findings. This creates a dilemma for the LoC and for 
Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann. On the one hand, affirming PREDEX as the 
sole means of ascertaining the safety of administering dexamethasone in 
this context would eliminate the likelihood of any empirically meaningful 
research on the matter (given the inevitably small sample size and thus 
low statistical power). This is methodologically disingenuous. On the other 
hand, such an affirmation admits that pregnant women and fetuses would 
be exposed to acceptable risks. But this is just what the LoC denies, 
making the call for clinical trials in the LoC and by Dreger, Feder, and 
Lindemann ethically disingenuous. The insistence on a randomized, 
prospective controlled trial is proffered in bad faith. 
 
THE BIOETHICS IMAGINARY 
 
We find only a few points of disagreement with Reis and Kessler’s 
summation of the historical context of the tragic record of the 
crudemedicalization of intersex conditions by John Money, except to 
observe that (a) Money’s approach has been discredited philosophically 
(McCullough 2002) and no longer shapes current standards in pediatric 
endocrinology (Lee, Houk, Ahmed, and Hughes 2006), (b) Dr. New is not 
Dr. Money, and (c) Reis and Kessler’s narrative is wholly irrelevant to 
whether one is obliged to get one’s facts right. Still, they and Green and 
Tamar-Mattis repeat the charge, more crudely leveled by Dreger, Feder, 
and Lindemann, that the normative impetus for using dexamethasone 
here could only be predicated on the heterosexist and homophobic 
premise that dexamethasone somehow prevents lesbianism. 
 
Neither Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann, nor Green, nor Reis and Kessler, 
nor Tamar-Mattis offers any evidence whatever for this accusation that 
investigators of prenatal administration of dexamethasone are engaging 
in heteronormative eugenics.2 Having exempted bioethics from the 
discipline of evidence-based reasoning, Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann 
expect their readers and the readers of the LoC to accept their repeated 
trope of heart-felt “concern,” expressed more in sorrow than anger, as an 
intellectually and morally authoritative substitute. They also expect two 
government agencies and three universities, all committed to the 
improvement of medicine by evidence-based reasoning and bioethical 
oversight, to accept that evidence-based reasoning is “weird logic” and 
thus not required in research ethics. They thereby introduce into bioethics 
what we call the bioethics imaginary2: the systematic violation of 
evidence-based reasoning posing as methodologically legitimate. 
 
In the hands of Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann and their fellow 
interrogators the bioethics imaginary and its menagerie of “appearances” 
come to a bad end. Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann, along with Reis and 
Kessler, style themselves champions of the autonomy of pregnant women. 
It is therefore at least ironic that their deployment of the bioethics 
imaginary completely undermines the autonomy of pregnant women. Reis 
and Kessler imply that all these women seek to have, or would permit 
having, supplicant-like, their pregnancies and their choices for their 
children routinely abrogated by physicians, thus endorsing an 
unwarranted, paternalist condescension toward the considered views and 
capacity for autonomous judgment of pregnant women. It “appears” to 
Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann that clinically experienced, licensed 
physicians prescribing dexamethasone would blithely permit Dr. New to 
“push . . . all of the risk onto obstetricians who may have had no idea what 
they were part of and none of the expertise required to inform patients of 
the risks and unknowns.”  Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann thus treat 
pregnant women as children, as heteronomous creatures helplessly 
susceptible to manipulation by physicians (supported by professional 
organizations, peer reviewers, and editors of professional journals of 
endocrinology and sexuality), all of whom may have become the genial 
puppets of Dr. New, and thus incompetent, professionally illiterate, and 
criminally stupid. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Fully liberated from accepted standards of evidence-based and 
argument-based reasoning, the LoC and Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann 
expect their readers to embrace the trope of heartfelt, ideologically self-
ratifying “concern,” littered with groundless innuendos, as intellectually 
and morally acceptable in bioethics.We cordially decline to do so, based 
on the belief that, as a precedent, this would be catastrophic for the moral 
and intellectual integrity of the field of bioethics. We are not at all 
confident about whether subsequent events will affirm or undermine this 
integrity. We renew our call for the LoC to be withdrawn and for 
cosignatories to remove their names from it.3 The LoC, its signatories, and 
its defenders in the commentaries damage the rights and interests of 
persons with disorders of sexual development, which are best served by 
evidence-based and argument-based bioethics guiding rigorous 
scientific and clinical investigation. 
 
1. Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann repeatedly commit the methodological 
error of substituting rhetorical questions for evidencebased and argument-
based reasoning. Consider two examples.  They ask, “Are they—New and 
other clinicians—really thinking that it’s a good idea to use prenatal dex 
because otherwise girls are more likely to end up tomboyish, aggressive, 
and lesbian?” Philosophers will note in passing the loaded question fallacy 
(“So, when did you stop beating your husband?”). This is not only a crude 
reductio of a vast array of clinical and normative concerns; it also requires 
that the signators of the LoC both affirm and deny that the use of fetal 
dexamethasone is only for cosmetic purposes, yet another violation of the 
principle of noncontradiction. They also ask, “McCullough and colleagues 
reveal to us New’s apparent excuse for not having IRB approval: She 
actually wrote only one script for prenatal dex. So why does theMaria New 
Children’s Hormone Foundation boast to prospective patients that ‘She 
has treated over 600 pregnant women at risk for the birth of a CAH-
affected child’?”  The context of the text on the foundation’s webpage is 
plain: Treatment is offered under the protocol we described, under which 
Dr. New does not prescribe dexamethasone to the patients of referring 
physicians. 
 
2. The phrases “transgressive bioethics” and “heteronormative eugenics” 
were coined by Dr. Hippen and therefore would not appear in any 
available literature search, as Kraft discovered concerning the former. The 
phrase “the bioethics imaginary” originates with Dr. McCullough. We hope 
these phrases, on balance, are more illustrative than obscurantist of the 
rhetorical maneuvers used in the LoC and by Dreger, Feder, and 
Lindemann and other commentators, but concede the risk of the reverse 
with any neologism. 
 3. Dreger, Feder, and Lindemann (2010) come to the defense of the LoC. 
Feder was the corresponding author (fetaldex.org 2010a).  Lindemann 
solicited co-signatories to the draft version of the LoC (mcw bioethics 
listserv e-mail posted January 29, 2010, 11:48 a.m.), and Feder and Dreger 
jointly sent letters that followed on the submission of the LoC to the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and three universities (fetaldex.org 2010b). Dreger, 
Feder, and Lindemann therefore bear direct responsibility forwithdrawing 
the LoC. As the person publicly taking responsibility for posting on 
fetaldex.org, Dreger bears direct responsibility for posting on fetaldex.org 
the announcements of the withdrawal of the LoC and of withdrawals 
of co-signatories. 
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